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Introduction
To combat the economic crisis and face its
enormous debt, the Greek government is
searching for ways to increase income rapidly
and reduce spending immediately. Many Greeks
are unaware that shortcomings in their jus-
tice system are detrimental to the nation’s social
and economic well-being (Tsakyrakis). The
effects of court reforms on the nation’s finan-
cial system are not as obvious as those of pen-
sions and taxation reform, and the direct quan-
titative results are more difficult to measure.
Therefore, reform of the justice system is not
a high government priority. Furthermore, the
judiciary is often ignored in reform efforts due
to its fierce independence, resistance to govern-
ment encroachment, and inaccessible informa-
tion (United States Department of State). Yet
Greece requires substantial structural reform to
stimulate economic growth, reduce bureau-
cracy, and prevent a relapse (Embassy of the
United States; Embassy of Greece). Economist
Stefan Voigt describes the judiciary as the means
by which a government commits itself to the
promises it makes (p. 101). Thus, as the Greek
government searches to gain public trust and
general cooperation with its newly enacted laws
and austerity measures, it should more seriously
consider reforming its system of justice.
A 2011 annual report by the United States
Department of State harshly criticized the inef-
ficiencies of the Greek courts. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has also
denounced the nation for this deficiency.
Stavros Tsakyrakis, Greek attorney and associ-
ate professor of law at the University of Athens,
argues that the delays in the system are vast and
deleterious. According to Tsakyrakis, reform
of the judiciary would lead to substantial eco-
nomic benefits and cost savings for Greece. The
Embassy of the United States agrees that the
courts must run more quickly, especially in tax-
ation cases. Both the U.S. and Greek Embassies
acknowledge the pervasive problems and believe
that reform should be a priority.
THE INEFFICIENCIES OF THE
GREEK LEGAL SYSTEM
Megan Colville
The Greek Judicial System
The Greek constitution divides court juris-
dictions into two main sectors: civil/penal and
administrative. Each sector is further organized
into three levels of courts: courts of first
instance (lower courts), courts of appeals (appel-
late courts), and the Supreme Court. New
claims typically begin at the court of first
instance (However, under certain unusual cir-
cumstances they are heard directly by the
Supreme Court). Typically, if the losing party
contests the lower court’s decision on the
grounds of erroneous procedure or failure to
apply relevant law correctly, then the case is
heard by the court of appeals. If the appellate
court’s ruling is also challenged, the case then
advances to the Supreme Court. While the
Supreme Court’s decision is final and cannot be
appealed, the Court can remand the case to
the lower court for a full or partial retrial if it
finds procedural wrongdoing. In certain cases,
this cycle of appeals and retrials occurs multi-
ple times before a final resolution is achieved.
While criminal cases, such as illegal busi-
ness practices, may impact economic well-
being, civil and administrative suits more sig-
nificantly affect a nation’s economy. Civil courts
hear conflicts between private parties, includ-
ing contract disputes or property damage,
whereas administrative courts hear all admin-
istrative matters, such as civil service, social
security, public works’ competitions, tax issues,
and any compensation claims against the state
(Symvoulio tis Epikrateias). Due to the broad
and extensive reach of the entire judicial branch,
I will focus mainly on the deficiencies of the
administrative courts and the overarching neg-
ative effects of the administrative and civil court
shortcomings on Greece. Problems caused by
inefficiencies in the criminal courts, though
substantial, are beyond the scope of this paper.
Inefficiencies of the Judiciary
An important function of a judiciary is to
bring charges and obtain resolutions quickly
(Embassy of the United States). A recent study
by Michael Mitsopoulos and Theodore Pelagidis
reveals a steady increase in the time needed to
dispense justice in Greek courts (2010, pp. 17–18). 
In one random sample they found that 20 per-
cent of cases had not been settled even after ten
years and that 65 percent of cases were between
five and ten years old and awaiting new verdicts
in appeals court. Another sample of 100 cases
from 2006 had an average age of 71⁄2 years in the
courts, with 30 percent of cases over seven years
old, one that was 26 years old, and another
that was 33 years old (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis,
2010, pp. 26–27).
The increasing number of new lawsuits
filed each day, combined with the sluggish
disposal of cases, contributes to the growing
backlog in Greek courts. The ratio of cases
remaining at the end of a year to the total num-
ber of cases introduced each year continues to
rise steadily (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2010, 
p. 17). Tsakyrakis believes that the existing back-
log of cases is so immense that the problem has
become insurmountable. He reported in May
2011 that there were 140,000 cases pending in
the administrative court of first instance and
11,000 pending in the court of appeals. Trial
lengths, which add to this build up, are in
turn adversely impacted by the backlog they
help to cause. As of March 2011, new com-
mercial disputes in Athens were being sched-
uled for their first appearance in court in 2013
(Papaioannou, p. 2).
The prevalence of appeals is another fac-
tor that slows the courts. There cost of appeal is
low, and the majority of first-instance decisions
are appealed (Papaioannou, p. 12). Since dif-
ferent courts often produce contradictory rul-
ings, the probability of having an unfavorable
verdict reversed on appeal is significant. This
lack of consistency in judgments thus creates
greater incentive to appeal. Clearly, the time
needed to resolve a case increases with addi-
tional court reviews. Furthermore, when cases
reach the highest court after multiple appeals,
they can be remanded for full or partial retrial
when procedural errors are found. While statis-
tical information regarding retrial in adminis-
trative courts is essentially impossible to gather,
statistics from civil courts reveal that over 40
percent of cases heard by the Areios Pagos, or
civil Supreme Court, are sent back to the
appeals court for retrial (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2010, p. 25).1 Although this rate is
similar to the remand rate in other countries,
retrials are an additional postponement, adding
both to the length of trials and to Greece’s
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already enormous backlog (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2010, p. 28). Some cases can even get
stuck in a cycle of repeated retrials if lower
courts do not properly follow procedure or
ignore or misinterpret relevant laws.
The excessive length of trials is a signifi-
cant problem for the courts and Greece as a
whole. Various international councils have crit-
icized the nation, including the European Court
of Human Rights, which sanctioned Greece
for violating Article 6, Section 1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights—the right to a
fair trial within reasonable time (European
Court . . . , p. 1). Every lengthy trial is a poten-
tial violation of these sanctions, which award
financial compensation from the state to the
parties in the suit. Additionally, the large gap
between time of filing and time of decision pub-
lication makes information difficult to gather
and statistics hard to collect (Embassy of the
United States). The public is often unaware of
court decisions, such as the punishment of large
tax evaders, inhibiting the court’s function of
determent. Moreover, lengthy trials act as a dis-
incentive to business growth and investment
since entrepreneurs and investors are apprehen-
sive about getting entangled in potentially
perpetual litigation. 
To increase the efficiency and clearance
rate of the courts, the judiciary needs to stream-
line its processes (Embassy of the United States).
Judicial oversight boards and higher courts
should set standards of efficiency to encour-
age case disposal and monitor progress
(Papaioannou, p. 12). They should also place a
strict limit on the number of postponements
allowed and establish penalties for lawyers or
parties who intentionally delay proceedings.
Greater consistency of verdicts across courts and
judges would help to reduce the number of
appeals and, consequently, the average length
of cases.
While allowed in civil and administrative
trials, settling cases outside of court is uncom-
mon in Greece, possibly due to national tradi-
tions and the citizens’ characteristic pride
(Tsakyrakis). However, the backlog could be sig-
nificantly reduced if cases were settled rather
than tried. Despite many attempts to promote
settlement procedures, Greek citizens still
choose to solve their legal disputes in court
(Koussoulis). Justice Konstantinos Koussoulis
of the Supreme Administrative Court attributes
this disregard for out-of-court settlement to the
Greek tendency to refuse compromise. While
it would be difficult to bring about enthusi-
asm for the practice, the judiciary could take
various actions to encourage the use of settle-
ment. Improved procedures, such as reduced
fees or priority hearing dates, could be imple-
mented to provide incentives to litigants, attor-
neys, and judges to resolve cases without going
to trial.
Another factor contributing to the back-
log and the inefficiency of the courts is the
low expense of litigation (Koussoulis). In 2009,
the litigation fee was a mere 15 euro and the
average award of court expenses in Mitsopoulos
and Pelagidis’ 100-case sample was only 1,161
Euro (2010, p. 28). Greeks tend to look to the
courts for solutions, creating unnecessary work
for the judiciary in cases that could be solved
elsewhere (Tsakyrakis; Koussoulis). To dis-
courage frivolous litigation and promote out-of-
court problem-solving methods, court fees
should be increased appropriately.
Not only is the quantitative performance
of the courts inadequate, but the qualitative per-
formance is often deficient as well. Greece lacks
a strict practice of common law. Lower courts
tend to create their own rulings, which fre-
quently conflict with previous higher court ver-
dicts on similar issues. As Professor Philomila
Tsoukala of Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter remarked, “Who knows what outcome you
will receive when you go to court?” These incon-
sistencies in rulings encourage citizens to
take their problems to the courts and appeal
unfavorable first-instance verdicts (Mitsopoulos
and Pelagidis, 2010, p. 18). In a 1999 study, 
F. Andrew Hanssen discovered a positive math-
ematical relationship between this uncertainty
of judgments and the rate of litigation (as
cited in Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2010, p. 22).
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1This research is difficult because appellate and lower
court judges have the subjective authority to decide which
cases to publish, which results in few published decisions.
Access to unpublished cases is restricted to those parties
with a legal interest in obtaining the judgment. While the
Supreme Court must publish all cases, only the reasoning
directly relevant to its decision is provided. The publication
does not include a historical summary of the case or rele-
vant dates that would indicate a case’s duration in the sys-
tem (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2010, p. 24).
Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis also suggest that
the rise in appeal rates may be correlated with
a decline in the quality of first-instance court
decisions (2010, p. 18).
In addition to contributing to the growing
caseload, inadequate judicial verdicts result in
other problems as well. An unpredictable judi-
ciary could deter cautious investors who feel
insecure about the legal protection of their
assets and fear the possibility of being caught in
legal disputes (Embassy of the United States).
Citizens recognize the unreliability of the
judiciary, and this awareness adds to their dis-
trust of the court system and the Greek govern-
ment as a whole.
Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis cite insufficient
organization, excessively burdensome proce-
dures, and severe restrictions in the way legal
services are supplied as factors that impact
the quality of judicial decisions (2010, p. 18).
Hence, in order to improve the quality of ver-
dicts, measures should be taken to reorganize
the judiciary, simplify court processes, and
remove unnecessary and extreme barriers.
Requiring lower courts to follow precedents set
by higher courts, and establishing a custom of
common law, will improve the consistency of
judgments across all courts. 
The poor quality of judgments is often a
result of inexperience. Judges lack both ade-
quate general training and instruction in con-
temporary subjects (Tsakyrakis). To become a
judge, a Greek must pass an exam and attend
a School for Judges and Prosecutors. The
maximum age for entrance to this school is
forty, so the majority of judges start young
(Tsakyrakis). Graduates enter the public sec-
tor directly without attending law school or
having any real-world law practice, experiences
that could develop their abilities to make
informed, educated decisions. Judges are not
elected but are appointed by presidential decree
and are therefore less accountable to the pub-
lic. With no procedures for quality control,
the system allows judges to do very little 
yet earn respectable pay and pensions. Advance-
ment of their careers is almost guaranteed 
by seniority rather than skill, clearance rates,
or quality of decisions (Tsakyrakis). These 
practices do not typically encourage a strong
sense of commitment and dedication to the
position.
Buscaglia and Dakolias found that level
of pay does not significantly affect judicial per-
formance. Therefore, simply raising salaries
will not improve the quality and efficiency of
judges (as cited in Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis,
2010, p. 19). There is evidence that non-pecu-
niary factors, such as measuring performance,
fostering accountability, and advancing case-
load management, will improve judicial per-
formance (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2010, 
p. 19). Therefore, the judiciary should imple-
ment methods for performance assessment.
A responsible party, such as the judicial over-
sight board, should observe and analyze
assessment data. Prospects of promotion are
also shown to affect the behavior of judges;
consequently, performance data should be
more significant as criteria in promotion con-
siderations than the simple number of years
of experience (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis,
2010, p. 19).
To cultivate better judicial performance,
Greece should also improve schools and train-
ing programs for judges. A study in Pakistan
conducted by Matthieu Chemin found that a
major training program for judges both quick-
ened the judicial process and boosted produc-
tivity, resulting in a GDP increase of approxi-
mately 0.5 percent, whereas the program itself
cost only around 0.1 percent of GDP (as cited by
Papaioannou, p. 13). Similarly, wider curricular
requirements and higher test standards would
reduce the number of decisions formed on
limited knowledge and the delays caused by lack
of judicial familiarity with the subject matter.
Elias Papaioannou, an economics professor at
Dartmouth College, suggests that the curricu-
lum include topics such as modern corporate
finance and accounting practices, competition
issues, and stock-market fraud so judges can
better address contemporary commercial dis-
putes (p. 13).
Revising the eligibility requirements for
judgeship is another possible improvement to
the system. In the United States, it is custom-
ary for judges to obtain their Juris Doctorates
first and then work as attorneys before running
for judicial positions. Following this model
would allow Greek judges to gain valuable legal
experience. Elections would establish account-
ability to the citizens and require judges to per-
form well in order to be reelected.
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According to Justice Koussoulis, ineffec-
tive controls on judges’ performance should
be a main concern. Furthermore, an inde-
pendent judiciary is vital to promoting impar-
tiality and guarding against the influence of
undue external political pressures. Conse-
quently, courts self-regulate by maintaining
their own oversight boards, or judicial councils.
These judicial councils are responsible for
administrative measures such as the observa-
tion of court proceedings and the promotion
and discipline of judges. In Greek administra-
tive courts, judges with at least two years of
experience in their appointed positions are eli-
gible for random selection to the judicial coun-
cil for terms of one year.
The council is essential to a well-function-
ing judiciary but has many shortcomings.
Judges on the council retain the same amount
of casework as non-members of the council and
therefore lack ample time to devote to council
responsibilities (Koussoulis). Not only do they
have insufficient time, but judges picked for the
council also may not desire the position. Since
selection is by chance, board members do not
necessarily care about the job and therefore may
not apportion it proper attention. In addition,
the one-year terms disrupt routine and conti-
nuity. These deficiencies in the council may eas-
ily go unnoticed since there is no mechanism
in place to monitor its operation.
The structural inadequacies of the judicial
councils need to be addressed. If reorganized,
these councils could improve the overall effi-
ciency of the judiciary through increased
accountability of judges and better monitor-
ing of corruption. Justice Koussoulis proposed
changes such as establishing four-year terms for
members and instituting an election process.
Elections would better ensure the qualifications
of judges and their dedication to the council.
Koussoulis also recommends decreasing the
caseload for judges who serve on the council
so that they can focus more attention on the
responsibilities of the council position. If these
measures are implemented, the council will
be staffed with well-qualified judges who will
have the means and motivation to devote time
and effort to the position.
While an obvious solution to some of the
judiciary’s problems is to employ more judges,
a 2008 report ranked Greece eighth of forty-
seven countries in a judge-to-population ratio,
which suggests that the nation already has an
adequate number of judges (Tsakyrakis). The
lack of ample administrative support staff, how-
ever, can delay judicial processes. When judges
are required to complete paperwork and other
clerical tasks, it adversely affects their produc-
tivity by shifting their time away from decid-
ing cases (Koussoulis; Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2010, p. 19). A study by Buscaglia and
Dakolias confirms that time spent by judges
on administrative activities correlates with
lower clearance rates, whereas time spent on
adjudicative tasks is strongly associated with an
increase in clearance rates (as cited in Mitsopou-
los and Pelagidis, 2010, p. 35). Moreover, this
lack of support staff delays the release of verdicts
in Greece, the publication of which are typically
released at least six months after cases are
decided (Papaioannou, p. 2).
While hiring more judicial assistants,
clerks, and other administrative personnel
would require a slight increase in government
spending, it has the potential of reducing both
the backlog and lengths of trials significantly.
Another solution is to invest in and imple-
ment new technologies to speed up administra-
tive work. Papaioannou believes computeriza-
tion and IT are desperately needed in the courts.
Court-specific websites that provide real-time
information on court schedules and hearing
times will ease confusion among lawyers and
plaintiffs (Papaioannou, pp. 11–12). Buscaglia
and Dakolias found that capital infrastructure,
such as case-management systems, is typically
inexpensive and has been found to improve
clearance rates (as cited in Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2010, p. 35).
Until recently, the Greek legal profession
was among about 70 professions that were
regulated by the government, a practice that
severely impeded competition in these fields
(Daley). One regulation index on the ease of
market entry for lawyers named Greece the
most restrictive of all European Union coun-
tries, ranking it well above most other nations
in the study (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2010,
pp. 20–21). Factors such as pricing of services,
advertising, location, diversification, business
forms, intra-business cooperation, and intra-
professional cooperation were all regulated in
some way by the Greek government.
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Paradoxically, Greece sets low require-
ments for lawyers in terms of education, prac-
tice, and examinations (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2010, p. 20). To attend law school,
graduating high school students must pass a
test that essentially assesses their ability to
memorize a study book (Tsoukala). They then
study for four years and take the bar exam.
The combination of this education and regula-
tion established a standard of lower quality legal
services at higher costs. To maintain income and
maintain steady workloads, lawyers actively seek
clients and encourage lawsuits. This practice
results in unnecessary trials and adds to the
growing backlog.
In their 2010 publication, Mitsopoulous and
Pelagidis argued for deregulation of the legal pro-
fession in order to increase competition and
improve efficiency (p. 33). Regulations restrict
market competition and make attorneys obliga-
tory for certain legal procedures, essentially
creating a fixed income for law professionals.
With encouragement from the European Union
and the International Monetary Fund, the Greek
government passed a law in early 2011 to open
all closed professions. However, lawyers remain
a powerful force in society and have heavily
protested the law. To date, not much has changed
in the practice of the legal profession (Embassy
of Greece). The elimination of barriers will help
improve both the quality of justice and the econ-
omy. Also, to coincide with the reduction of busi-
ness restrictions, stricter education requirements
should be placed on lawyers.
Many opportunities exist for lawyers to act
unethically. Greek lawyers are notorious for tax
evasion and have been known to lie to clients in
order to augment the demand for their services
(Savvides; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2010, 
p. 28). Corruption among judges, due to lack
of experience and accountability, combined with
the Greek public-sector apathy, is also a prob-
lem. Disreputable judges can delay the process
to extract bribes from litigants (Sotiropoulos).
A 2008 study found that 25 percent of public
officials were breaking the law (Sotiropoulos).
Although statistical data about dishonest judges
is scarce because requesting information from
disciplinary courts is illegal, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State described the Greek courts as
“ripe with corruption” (Sotiropoulos; United
States Department of State).
The public also feels that judges are more
likely than not to be corrupt (Ellis). The judi-
ciary must solve the corruption problem in
order to gain public trust and improve the effec-
tiveness of the courts. To discourage corrup-
tion, the overview councils should actively
search for and punish corrupt judges. Train-
ing programs on ethics could help judges and
lawyers avoid ethical violations. Enhancing
transparency would also prevent corruption;
e.g., Papaioannou recommends mandatory
posting of trial progress information online 
(p. 12).
Social Implications
An inefficient judiciary negatively impacts
more than just the courts. Both economic and
social progress are hindered by a justice system
that cannot resolve disputes or enforce laws
effectively (Dakolias, p. 1). Not only do the short-
comings of the judiciary affect the public trust,
but they also violate European Court of Human
Rights’ sanctions and deter investment.
Greece faces a vast problem with politi-
cal legitimacy (Tsoukala). There is an overall
lack of respect for the law, which Maria-Luisa
Chavez, a representative from the United
Nations, believes may stem from reactions to
past military dictatorships. Civil disobedience is
common (Tsoukala). Workers are constantly on
strike; many people do not pay tolls and park
their automobiles wherever they wish. The
nation has a considerable problem with tax eva-
sion, and some businesses attempt to hide their
profits (United States Department of State).
These clear violations of the law often go unpun-
ished, resulting in continued criminal behavior,
social acceptance of crime, and encouragement
for others to break the law (Embassy of Greece).
Representatives from the Greek Embassy
in the United States believe that public dis-
trust of government is the biggest obstacle to
economic growth. Tsoukala observes that Greek
citizens need to cooperate with the government
in order to achieve the best economic results,
but struggle to do so because they lack trust
in the institutions. The Greek government needs
to find a way to secure public trust in order to
implement new policies successfully. This
trust is virtually impossible to gain without
reform of the judiciary.
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To gain the trust of the citizens, the courts
need to process cases quickly and consistently.
Similar cases should result in similar verdicts
so that the affected parties can predict and
rely on probable outcomes. The courts should
also increase transparency and actively work
to reduce corruption. Cutting the length of time
between initial filing and publishing of the
verdict would better ensure citizens’ rights to
a speedy trial. The ECHR considers lengthy
trials likely to undermine public confidence
(European Court . . . , p. 3).
Between 1999 and 2009, the ECHR
declared that in Greece, approximately 300 judi-
cial proceedings, the majority of which con-
cerned the administrative courts, were excessive
in length (European Court . . . , p. 1). It deemed
this violation of Article 6, Section 1 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, the right
to a fair trial within a reasonable time, a
“chronic problem in the country.” In 2010,
the ECHR decided to issue a pilot-judgment due
to the urgent need of providing all Greek citi-
zens with rapid and appropriate redress (Euro-
pean Court . . . , p. 3). Recognition of the prob-
lem by the ECHR confirms the general low
confidence in the Greek judiciary.
Not only do these violations negatively
impact public perception of the courts, but they
also hurt Greece financially. The ECHR ordered
Greece to establish a remedy and implement
compensation for trials of excessive length
and to do so within a year of the judgment. In
the particular case in which they passed pilot-
judgment, the ECHR awarded the ten plain-
tiffs €14,000 each, plus an expense cost of €2,500
(European Court . . . , p. 4). All cases in Greek
courts now face potential fines, and the oppor-
tunity to collect this monetary penalty could act
as an incentive for citizens to bring unnecessary
cases to court (Tsakyrakis).
Economic Implications
The ECHR’s fines for excessively lengthy
trials are insignificant compared with other eco-
nomic implications of an inefficient judiciary.
For example, Tsakyrakis blames the courts for
Greece’s widespread tax evasion. Laws for tax-
ation exist; they simply need to be implemented
more efficiently (Embassy of the United States).
It is a function of the judiciary to penalize tax
evaders for both justice and deterrence. Jour-
nalist Tamis Ellis suggests that a few widely pub-
licized convictions of well-known individuals for
tax evasion could deter other likely offenders.
Greece desperately needs the revenue from tax-
ation, and the courts should be utilized to
help in securing it.
In addition to the trouble with tax evasion,
the nation has a severe problem with its busi-
ness climate. The World Bank’s “Doing Business
2012” ranked Greece 100 out of 183 economies
for the overall ease of doing business. This
places Greece well below the other OECD high-
income countries, whose average rank was 29
(World Bank Group, p. 7). The Ministry of For-
eign Affairs recognizes that Greece is a poor host
for big business, and the U.S. Embassy calls
Greece’s business environment the most diffi-
cult in Europe (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; Embassy of the United States).
While the laws themselves are an imped-
iment to business, their enforcement is also a
barrier. Economists recognize the significant
effect on economic activity of a predictable,
speedy, and consistent judiciary. Richard 
Messick, Co-Director of World Bank Thematic
Group on Legal Institutions, states that a judi-
cial system promotes economic growth by
enforcing property rights, checking abuses of
government power, upholding the rule of law,
and, most importantly, enabling exchanges
between private parties (p. 2).
A study by Stefan Voigt finds a signifi-
cant relationship between judicial accounta-
bility and per capita income (p. 95). He believes
that people who do not trust the courts to
protect their property rights are less likely to
create wealth. Less wealth means less tax rev-
enue for the state. Furthermore, high levels of
uncertainty in judgments are associated with
lower aggregate investment, economic growth,
and income. Voigt claims that if the judiciary
acts effectively as a neutral arbiter, more busi-
ness contracts will be made and, consequently,
aggregate investment will increase and the
economy will expand (p. 101).
Data to substantiate these theories are
often hard to define and collect, but recently
more empirical evidence is being reported
that supports these claims (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2011, p. 55). For example, Matthieu
Chemin finds in his study of India that an
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inefficient judiciary strongly impedes economic
outcomes (p. 249). Surveys of firms in 69
nations have shown that the majority of busi-
nesses cite legal uncertainty as a major bar-
rier to business operations (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2011, p. 55). The World Bank has
found that the level of investment and overall
economic performance correlate with confi-
dence in government institutions (Messick, 
p. 4).
Legal restitution in Greece is slow and
often provides ineffective remedies. Long delays
can easily put a small company out of busi-
ness; this situation could be a serious problem
for a nation where 96 percent of its enter-
prises employ ten or fewer workers (Kitsanto-
nis, p. 1).
An inconsistent, unreliable judiciary dis-
courages contractual business interactions.
Contracts reduce the risk involved in business
deals by making them legally binding. If legal
resolution is frequently delayed or ineffective,
contracts lose value. Companies may be hesi-
tant to enter into contracts knowing that a law-
suit for breach may take years to work its way
through the courts to final restitution. The party
that fulfills its obligations first essentially has
no assurance of performance by the other party.
Inefficient enforcement of contracts then allows
for unfair post-contractual opportunistic behav-
ior of one party (Chemin, p. 231).
If courts are not trusted, then companies
are forced to rely upon reputation when conduct-
ing business. Transactions then tend to occur
only between established, reputable businesses,
making it hard for new enterprises to enter the
market successfully (Klerman, p. 3). Compa-
nies would attempt to maintain their current
relationships instead of searching for new busi-
ness partners (Chemin, p. 241). To connect
with new partners, businesses may rely on inter-
mediaries or simultaneous exchanges. To avoid
risky contractual relationships altogether, firms
may perform all necessary operations in-house
instead of contracting services out.
Free-market trade is constrained by this
reliance on reputation or intermediaries,
restraint on fair competition, and vertical inte-
gration, consequently resulting in a defective
financial system. Studies have shown that all
of these methods result in higher transaction
costs for businesses (Messick, p. 3). Econo-
mist Oliver Williamson believes that a “high-
performance economy” contains a large num-
ber of long-term contracts, which are not found
in states with ineffective judicial systems (as
cited in Messick, p. 3).
A weak judiciary may also adversely affect
credit. Courts act as outlets for creditors to col-
lect on debt. With a slow-moving system, bor-
rowers are more inclined to default, knowing
that creditors have no quick or easy remedy.
This insecurity compels creditors to be more
cautious in loaning, reducing the availability
of credit (Chemin, p. 241). A study by Jappelli,
Pagano, and Bianco demonstrates that increased
judicial efficiency reduces credit rationing and
thus expands lending (p. 240). The judiciary’s
failure to enforce repayment of debts restrains
economic growth and innovation.
Ranked 155 out of 183 countries in
investor protection, Greece struggles to stim-
ulate domestic investment and attract foreign
investors (World Bank Group, p. 58). This low
investor confidence can be attributed in part
to the inconsistent decisions of the court and
the fear of legal disputes (Embassy of the United
States). Not only is this lack of investment a
problem in and of itself, but businesses are
also forced to find ways to counteract this
deficiency. To secure funding, a company may
offer favorable contractual terms to prospective
investors, thereby limiting its own potential for
economic gain.
Aware of the financial impacts of judicial
systems, the World Bank has been giving sup-
port and providing loans since 1993 to countries
where judicial reform is needed for economic
development (Messick, p. 1). With this program,
the World Bank is working to improve judge
selection, evaluation, and discipline; to speed up
the processing of cases by implementing bet-
ter management and IT systems; to expand
access to alternate methods of dispute resolu-
tion; and to improve judge- and lawyer-training
programs for inclusion of more ethics and
contemporary areas of law (Messick, p. 5). While
Greece is not currently part of this program,
it would benefit from these reforms.
Conclusions
Currently in Greece, problems are not
addressed until they are obtrusive (United States
20
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Department of State). While the government
seeks greater efficiency, its priority at the
moment is to cut the deficit (Savvides). How-
ever, in order to prevent relapse, Greece also
needs to take measures to encourage long-term
growth. To achieve a prosperous future, the
country needs to improve its business climate
vastly and create an environment that welcomes
both foreign and domestic investment. Simply
revamping the laws and regulations will be inef-
fective unless the system that enforces them
is also improved. With the current inefficiency
and ineffectiveness of the courts, new policies
will have little impact.
The major problems with the court sys-
tem cannot be solved simply through additional
funding and resources, but there are some rel-
atively simple fixes that could make signifi-
cant improvements to the judiciary. Most of
these changes would cost little, if anything, 
and would greatly improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the courts. Greece should work
to cut the trial lengths and increase the con-
sistency of verdicts. Better training for both
lawyers and judges would help to enhance 
quality and reduce corruption. Information
technology should be implemented to help 
with administration and add transparency to the
proceedings.
A nation’s laws and their enforcement have
a strong impact on both public trust and the
business climate. Citizens look to the courts for
fair and speedy trials. Businesses and investors
need to trust that the laws intended to protect
them will do so. Currently, Greece’s court sys-
tem, which is meant to safeguard businesses
through contractual enforcements and con-
flict resolutions, is actually a barrier to busi-
nesses and the nation’s overall economic
growth. In order to solve these problems, Greece
should make judicial reform a priority during
these crucial times.
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